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Abstract 
 This article attempts to highlight various motivating factors which 
contribute to increased incidence of suicide missions in Nigeria and world-
wide. Boko Haram, the Islamic religious sect, whose name means "Western 
education is sacrilege" in the Hausa language of Nigeria's north, has been 
waging an increasingly bloody fight against the nation’s Federal government 
and some Northern States governments. Boko Haram has targeted Nigeria's 
police, rival clerics, politicians, and public institutions with increasing 
violence since 2009. Some experts say the group should primarily be seen as 
leading an armed revolt against the government's entrenched corruption, 
abusive security forces, strife between the disaffected Muslim north and 
Christian south, and widening regional economic disparity in an already 
impoverished country. The heart-wrenching and horrible daily accounts of 
suicide bombings rarely reveal the underlying causes or the bombers’ 
motivations. But without understanding these motivations and addressing 
them, it would appear that governments or organizations that seek to end 
suicide bombings are likely to be disappointed. However, in order to 
understand this complex phenomenon it is important to consider the 
contextual factors. Boko Haram's suspected bombing of a United Nation’s 
building in Abuja in August 2011 and its ties to regional terror groups may 
signal a new trajectory and spark a stronger international response that 
makes it harder to address the north's alienation. 
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Introduction 
            Suicide terrorism is a problematic term to define. There is an ongoing 
debate on definitions of terrorism itself. Kofi Annan, as Secretary General of 
the UN, defined terrorism in March 2005 in the General Assembly as any 
action "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants" for the purpose of intimidation (United Nations, 2007). This 
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definition would distinguish suicide terrorism from suicide bombing in that 
suicide bombing does not necessarily target non-combatants, and is not 
widely accepted. With awareness of that debate in mind, suicide terrorism 
itself has been defined by Pedahzur as a diversity of violent actions 
perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are 
close to zero (Pedahzur, 2004). This captures suicide bombing, and the range 
of suicide tactics. A suicide attack, therefore, is an attack upon a target, in 
which an attacker intends to kill others and/or cause great damage, knowing 
that he or she will either certainly or most likely die in the process. The 
means of suicide attack usually include vehicles filled with explosives, 
passenger planes carrying large amounts of fuel, and individuals wearing 
vests filled with explosives due to the amount of devastation these methods 
can cause within the short period of time the attacker is alive and in control. 
Synonyms include suicide attack, suicide-homicide bombing, martyrdom 
operation, and predatory martyrdom (Hassan, 2009). 
            More than 800 people have died in drive-by killings and bombings 
blamed on Boko Haram between 2010 and 2013 (Wikipedia, 2013). The sect 
has demanded, among others, that strict Shariah law be implemented across 
the entire country. The sect has used suicide car bombs against their targets. 
Nigeria's military claimed it killed the sect's spokesman and a commander 
outside the city of Kano, potentially shaking up a sect that has continued 
attacks despite a tighter military presence in northern cities. The killing of 
members of the sect's senior leadership comes as the group changed some of 
its tactics and attacked several mobile phone towers throughout northern 
Nigeria, disrupting communications in a nation reliant on cellular phones. 
            Suicide bombing attacks have become a weapon of choice among 
terrorist groups because of their lethality and ability to cause mayhem and 
fear. Though depressing, the almost daily news reports of deaths caused by 
suicide attacks rarely explain what motivates the attackers. Between 1981 
and 2006, 1200 suicide attacks constituted 4 percent of all terrorist attacks in 
the world and killed 14,599 people or 32 percent of all terrorism related 
deaths (Hassan, 2009; Pedahzur, 2004). The question is why?  
Motivations of Suicide Missions  
The sect treats anything western as completely un-Islamic. It 
considers western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion’s 
weakness. Hence the sect’s declaration that conventional banking, taxation, 
jurisprudence, western institutions and particularly western education are 
infidel and as such must be avoided by Muslims. Its ideological mission is to 
overthrow the secular Nigerian state and impose strict Islamic Sharia law in 
the country. Its members are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian 
state is a cesspit of social vices, thus ‘the best thing for a devout Muslim to 
do was to “migrate” from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place 
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and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and 
moral deprivation’ ((Straziuso, 2012; Onuoha, 2011).  
            However, suicide bombing is a very complex phenomenon. It is 
difficult if not impossible to examine the issue of Suicide Bombing in an 
impassionate manner. The topic is shrouded in speculations and assumptions. 
With the deceased no longer there, examination of motives becomes 
difficult. It has been a focus of research in recent times (Hassan, 2009). 
However inherent biases of researchers also distort or muddle the picture: 
researchers from western countries focus the issue around political liberty 
and notion of democracy, while those from Islamic countries tend to take the 
afterlife-reward notion as an incentive for suicide bombing (Takeda, 2010; 
Mir, 2011).  
            Although the use of suicide attacks has occurred throughout recent 
history, its main notoriety as a specific kind of attack began in the 1980s and 
involved explosives deliberately carried to the target either on the person or 
in a civilian vehicle and delivered by surprise. Following the success of a 
1983 truck bombing of two barracks buildings in Beirut that helped drive 
American and French Multinational Force troops from Lebanon, the tactic 
spread to insurgent groups like the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, and Islamist 
groups such as Hamas  (Hassan, 2010). 
            Observers believe suicide attacks have become popular because of 
their lethal effectiveness, but attackers' motivation is disputed. One scholar 
attributes over 90% of attacks prior to the Iraq Civil War to a goal of 
withdrawal of occupying forces (Pape, 2005); while another, Scott Atran 
argues that since 2004 the overwhelming majority of bombers have been 
motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom, and that these attacks have 
been much more numerous. In just two years, 2004-2005, there were more 
suicide attacks, roughly 600 than in Pape's entire sample (Atran, 2006).  
            Typically, most suicide bombers are psychologically normal and are 
deeply integrated into social networks and emotionally attached to their 
national communities. Randomly attached labels such as “mad” denote one’s 
inability to fathom the deeper reasons but don’t advance our understanding 
of the causes of the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Rather, they impede us 
from discovering its real nature, purpose and causes (Pedahzur, 2004). 
            At last, now we have some concrete data to begin addressing the 
question. The Suicide Terrorism Database in Flinders University in 
Australia, the most comprehensive in the world, holds information on suicide 
bombings in Iraq, Palestine-Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
which together accounted for 90 per cent of all suicide attacks between 1981 
and 2006. Analysis of the information contained therein yields some 
interesting clues: It is politics more than religious fanaticism that has led 
terrorists to blow themselves up (Hassan, 2009). 
European Scientific Journal   September 2013  edition vol.9, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
38 
Motivations of Suicide Bombers 
            John Campbell notes that the context of Boko Haram is easier to talk 
about than Boko Haram itself." Injustice and poverty, as well as the belief 
that the West is a corrupting influence in governance, are root causes of both 
the desire to implement sharia and Boko Haram's pursuit of an Islamic state, 
say experts. The emergence of Boko Haram signifies the maturation of 
long festering extremist impulses that run deep in the social reality of 
northern Nigeria. But the group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a 
symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally 
ripening into social chaos. The reintroduction of sharia criminal courts was 
originally proposed by the governor of the state of Zamfara in 1999, but the 
proposal quickly became a grassroots movement that led to its adoption in 
twelve states. Experts say there was widespread "disillusionment" with the 
way sharia was implemented, and that Boko Haram has tapped into this 
dissatisfaction, promoting the idea that an Islamic state would eliminate the 
inconsistencies. Injustice and poverty, as well as the belief that the West is a corrupting 
influence in governance, are root causes of both the desire to implement sharia and Boko 
Haram's pursuit of an Islamic state (Johnson, 2011). 
            The doctrine of asymmetric warfare views suicide attacks as a result 
of an imbalance of power, in which groups with little significant power 
resort to suicide bombing as a convenient tactic to demoralize the targeted 
civilians or government leadership of their enemies. Suicide bombing may 
also take place as a perceived response to actions or policies of a group with 
greater power (Pape, 2005). Groups which have significant power have no 
need to resort to suicide bombing to achieve their aims; consequently, 
suicide bombing is overwhelmingly used by guerrillas, and other irregular 
fighting forces. Among many such groups, there are religious overtones to 
martyrdom: attackers and their supporters may believe that their sacrifice 
will be rewarded in an afterlife. Suicide attackers often believe that their 
actions are in accordance with moral or social standards because they are 
aimed at fighting forces and conditions that they perceive as unjust. 
            According to Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Suicide 
Terrorism, 95% of suicide attacks in recent times have the same specific 
strategic goal: to cause an occupying state to withdraw forces from a 
disputed territory. Robert Pape's studies have found that suicide attacks are 
most often provoked by political occupation. Pape found the targeted 
countries were ones where the government was democratic and public 
opinion played a role in determining policy. Other characteristics Pape found 
included a difference in religion between the attackers and occupiers and that 
there was grassroots support for the attacks (Pape, 2005). Attackers were 
disproportionately from the educated middle classes (Atran, 2006). 
Characteristics which Pape thought to be correlated to suicide bombing and 
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bombers included: Islam, especially the influence of Salafi Islam; brutality 
and cruelty of the occupiers; competition among militant groups; and 
poverty, immaturity, poor education, past history of suicide attempts, or 
social maladjustment of the attackers (Pape, 2005). 
            In targeting potential recruits for suicide terrorism, it must be 
understood that terrorist attacks will not be prevented by trying to profile 
terrorists. They are not sufficiently different from everyone else. Insights into 
homegrown jiahdi attacks will have to come from understanding group 
dynamics, not individual psychology. Small-group dynamics can trump 
individual personality to produce horrific behavior in otherwise ordinary 
people (Pape, 2005).  
            Other researchers have argued that Pape's analysis is fundamentally 
flawed, particularly his contention that democracies are the main targets of 
such attacks (Wade and Reiter, 2007). Scott Atran found that non-Islamic 
groups have carried out very few bombings since 2003, while bombing by 
Muslim or Islamist groups associated with a "global ideology" of 
"martyrdom" has skyrocketed. In one year, in one Muslim country alone – 
2004 in Iraq – there were 400 suicide attacks and 2,000 casualties (Atran, 
2006). Still others argue that perceived religious rewards in the hereafter are 
instrumental in encouraging Muslims to commit suicide attacks (Oliver and 
Steinberg, 2004). Suicide operatives are overwhelmingly male in most 
groups, but among the Chechen rebels and the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) women form a majority of the attackers (Pape, 2005).  
            In his book Dead for Good, Hugh Barlow describes recent suicide 
attack campaigns as a new development in the long history of martyrdom 
that he dubs predatory martyrdom. Some individuals who now act alone are 
inspired by emails, radical books, the internet, various new electronic media, 
and a general public tolerance of extreme teachers and leaders with terrorist 
agendas (Barlow, 2007).  
            All acts of war in Islam are governed by Islamic legal rules of armed 
warfare or military jihad. These rules are covered in detail in the classical 
texts of Islamic jurisprudence (Khan, 2006). In orthodox Islamic law, jihad is 
a collective religious obligation on the Muslim community, when the 
community is endangered or Muslims are subjected to oppression and 
subjugation. The rules governing such conflicts include not killing women, 
children or non-combatants, and leaving cultivated or residential areas 
undamaged (Lewis and Churchill, 2008). For more than a millennium, these 
tenets were accepted by Sunnis and Shiites; however, since the 1980s 
militant Islamists have challenged the traditional Islamic rules of warfare in 
order to justify suicide attacks (Khan, 2006; Lewis and Churchill, 2008).  
            According to a report compiled by the Chicago Project on Suicide 
Terrorism, 224 of 300 suicide terror attacks from 1980 to 2003 involved 
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Islamist groups or took place in Muslim-majority lands (Pape, 2005). 
Another tabulation found a 4.5 fold increase in suicide bombings in the two 
years following Papes study and that the majority of these bombers were 
motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom (Atran, 2006).  
            Recent research on the rationale of suicide bombing has identified 
both religious and sociopolitical motivations (Hafez, 2007; Hassan, 2011). 
Those who cite religious factors as an important influence note that religion 
provides the framework because the bombers believe they are acting in the 
name of Islam and will be rewarded as martyrs. Since martyrdom is seen as a 
step towards paradise, those who commit suicide while discarding their 
community from a common enemy believe that they will reach an ultimate 
salvation after they die (Oliver, & Steinberg, 2004). Leor Halevi, a professor 
at Vanderbilt University and author of "Muhammad's Grave: Death Rites and 
the Making of Islamic Society", suggests that some suicide bombers are 
perhaps motivated by an escape from the potential punishment of the tomb 
that comes with martyrdom (Halevi, 2007). Other researchers have identified 
sociopolitical factors as more central in the motivation of suicide attackers 
(Bloom, 2007; Hassan, 2009; Takeda, 2010).  
            Pape suggests that resentment of foreign occupation and nationalism 
is the principal motivation for suicide attacks: Beneath the religious rhetoric 
with which such terror is perpetrated, it occurs largely in the service of 
secular aims. Suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation 
rather than a product of Islamic fundamentalism... Though it speaks of 
Americans as infidels, al-Qaida is less concerned with converting us to Islam 
than removing us from Arab and Muslim lands (Pape, 2005).  
            According to anthropologist Scott Atran and former CIA case officer 
Marc Sageman, support for suicide actions is triggered by moral outrage at 
perceived attacks against Islam and sacred values, but this is converted to 
action as a result of small world factors. They tend to go to violence in small 
groups consisting mostly of friends, and some kin. These groups arise within 
specific "scenes": neighborhoods, schools (classes, dorms), workplaces and 
common leisure activities: soccer, paintball, mosque discussion groups, 
barbershop, café, online chat-rooms (Atran, 2007; Sageman, 2007). 
            The evidence from the database largely discredits the common 
wisdom that the personality of suicide bombers and their religion are the 
principal cause. It shows that though religion can play a vital role in 
recruiting and motivating potential future suicide bombers, the driving force 
is not religion but a cocktail of motivations including politics, humiliation, 
revenge, retaliation and altruism. The configuration of these motivations is 
related to the specific circumstances of the political conflict behind the rise 
of suicide attacks in different countries (Lankford, 2010).  
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            Understanding the terrorist organization’s logic is more important 
than understanding individual motivations in explaining suicide attacks 
(Hoffman, 2003). Suicide bombings have high symbolic value because the 
willingness of the perpetrators to die signals high resolve and dedication to 
their cause. They serve as symbols of a just struggle, galvanize popular 
support, generate financial support for the organization and become a source 
of new recruits for future suicide missions. Suicide bombings serve the 
interests of the sponsoring organization in two ways: by coercing an 
adversary to make concessions, and by giving the organization an advantage 
over its rival in terms of support from constituencies. Contrary to the popular 
image that suicide terrorism is an outcome of irrational religious fanaticism, 
suicide bombing attacks are resolutely a politically-motivated phenomenon 
(Schweitzer, 2000). 
Humiliation, revenge and altruism appear to play a key role at the 
organizational and individual levels in shaping the sub-culture that promotes 
suicide bombings. Humiliation is an emotional process that seeks to 
discipline the target party’s behavior by attacking and lowering their own 
and others’ perceptions of whether they deserve respect (Barlow, 2007). 
Suicide bombings have high symbolic value because the willingness of the 
perpetrators to die signals high resolve and dedication to their cause. People 
tend to have a strong aversion to what they perceive as injustice, with the 
dark side manifested as revenge. One consequence of the desire for 
vengeance is an individual’s willingness to endure sacrifice to fulfill the act. 
Contemplation of revenge can appear to achieve a range of goals, including 
righting perceived injustices, restoring the self-worth of the vengeful 
individual and deterring future injustice. Revenge is also a response to the 
continuous suffering of an aggrieved community. At the heart of the whole 
process are perceptions of personal harm, unfairness and injustice, and the 
anger, indignation, and hatred associated with such perceptions. Men attach 
more value to vengeance than women; and young people are more prepared 
to act in a vengeful manner than older individuals. It is not surprising, then, 
to find that most suicide bombers are both young and male (Davis, 2004). 
The meaning and nature of suicide in a suicide bombing are strikingly 
different from ordinary suicide. Suicide bombing falls into the category of 
altruistic suicidal actions that involve valuing one’s life as less worthy than 
that of the group’s honor, religion, or some other collective interest. 
Religiously and nationalistically coded attitudes towards acceptance of 
death, stemming from long periods of collective suffering, humiliation and 
powerlessness enable political organizations to offer suicide bombings as an 
outlet for their people’s feelings of desperation, deprivation, hostility and 
injustice (Gambetta, 2005). 
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            For the individual, participating in a suicide mission is not about 
dying and killing alone but has a broader significance for achieving multiple 
purposes, from personal to communal. These include gaining community 
approval and political success; liberating the homeland; achieving personal 
redemption or honor; using martyrdom to effect the survival of the 
community; refusing to accept subjugation; seeking revenge for personal and 
collective humiliation; conveying religious or nationalistic convictions; 
expressing guilt, shame, material and religious rewards; escaping from 
intolerable everyday degradations of life under occupation, boredom, anxiety 
and defiance. The configuration of these purposes varies and is an outcome 
of specific circumstances of the political conflict behind the rise of suicide 
attacks as a tactic and a weapon (Hassan, 2010). 
Tactics  
            Hezbollah's attacks in 1983 during the Lebanese Civil War are the 
first examples of the modern suicide terrorism (Kurz & Bartles, 2007). 
Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) used the first suicide attack in 1996, and 
al Queda in the mid-1990s (Kurz & Bartles, 2007). The number of attacks 
using suicide tactics has grown between 2000 and 2005 (Atran, 2006). These 
attacks have been aimed at diverse military and civilian targets. 
            In Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, suicide bombings have been 
perpetrated generally by Islamist and occasionally by secular Palestinian 
groups including the PFLP (Pedahzur, 2004). In 1993, Hamas carried out the 
first suicide attack (Kurz & Bartles, 2007). Between October 2000 and 
October 2006, there were 167 clearly identified suicide bomber attacks, with 
51 other types of suicide attack (Schweitzer, 2007). It has been suggested 
that there were so many volunteers for the "Istishhadia" in the Second 
Intifada in Israel and the occupied territories, that recruiters and dispatchers 
had a 'larger pool of candidates' than ever before (Schweitzer, 2007).  
            In the ten years after September 11, 2001, there were 336 suicide 
attacks in Afghanistan and 303 in Pakistan, while there were 1,003 
documented suicide attacks in Iraq between March 20, 2003, and December 
31, 2010. Suicide bombings have also become a tactic in Chechnya, first 
being used in the conflict in 2000 in Alkhan Kala. A number of suicide 
attacks have also occurred in Russia as a result of the Chechen conflict, 
notably including the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 to the Beslan 
school hostage crisis in 2004. The 2010 Moscow Metro bombings are also 
believed to result from the Chechen conflict. There have also been suicide 
attacks in Western Europe and the United States. The September 11, World 
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks killed nearly 3000 people in New York, 
Washington D.C and Shanksville, Pennsylvania in 2001. An attack in 
London on 7 July 2005 killed 52 people (Wikipedia, 2012; Mir, 2011; 
Pedahzur, 2004).  
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Conclusion 
The causes of suicide bombings lie not in individual psychopathology 
but in broader social conditions (Falk & Morgenstern, 2009). Understanding 
and knowledge of these conditions is vital for developing appropriate public 
policies and responses to protect the public. For one, the conventional 
wisdom that bombers are insane or religious fanatics is wrong. Individual 
bombers show no personality disorders and the attacks themselves are often 
politically motivated, aimed at achieving specific strategic goals such as 
forcing concessions or generating greater support. Moreover, the motivations 
are complex: politics, humiliation, revenge, retaliation and altruism, all drive 
the individual to engage in, and the community to condone, suicide bombing. 
Indeed, as Hassan notes, participating in suicide bombing can fulfill a range 
of meanings from the “personal to communal” (Hassan, 2009; Gambetta, 
2005).               
            Suicide bombings are carried out by motivated individuals associated 
with community based organizations. Strategies aimed at finding ways to 
induce communities to abandon such support would curtail support for 
terrorist organizations. Strategies for eliminating or at least addressing 
collective grievances in concrete and effective ways would have a 
significant, and, in many cases, immediate impact on alleviating the 
conditions that nurture the subcultures of suicide bombings. Support for 
suicide bombing attacks is unlikely to diminish without tangible progress in 
achieving at least some of the fundamental goals that suicide bombers and 
those sponsoring and supporting them share (Hassan, 2009; Onuoha, 2011; 
Johnson, 2011; Straziuso, 2012). 
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